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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 The issue presented by this appeal is a jurisdictional 
one pending as well in three other courts of appeals1 - whether 
the administrative bodies that adjudicate black lung claims or 
the district courts have jurisdiction to resolve disputes 
regarding interest assessed against coal mine operators on 
reimbursements to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (the 
"Fund") for medical benefits that the Fund previously paid to or 
on behalf of claimants.  Underlying this jurisdictional dispute 
is a significant legal issue, which is the authority of the 
Department of Labor (the "Department") to assess interest against 
                     
1.  The other cases pending are Sea "B" Mining Company v. 
Director, OWCP, No. 93-1784 (4th Cir., filed June 22, 1993, 
argued Apr. 12, 1994); B & S Coal Company v. Director, OWCP, 93-
3665 (6th Cir. filed June 21, 1993); Peabody Coal Company v. 
Director, OWCP, 93-2597 (7th Cir. filed July 22, 1993, argued 
Feb. 23, 1994). 
 
 
operators and carriers on such claims for the period before the 
responsible party has had the opportunity to review the data 
supporting the medical benefit.  Because of the jurisdictional 
dispute, the legal issue has not been presented here or in the 
other three circuits, despite the apparent agreement among the 
parties that there is not likely to be much litigation over the 
amount of interest once that underlying issue is finally 
resolved.  
 In the matter before us, the Benefits Review Board (the 
"Board" or "BRB") determined that these actions may only be heard 
by the district courts.  Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge dismissing the actions.  BethEnergy 
Mines, Inc. and Barnes and Tucker Company, coal mine operators, 
filed this petition for review as part of a series of test cases.  
This court has jurisdiction over petitions for review of final 





 The Black Lung Benefits Act ("the Act"), 30 U.S.C. § 
901 et seq., establishes a comprehensive legislative scheme 
designed to compensate miners for medical problems and 
disabilities related to pneumoconiosis (black lung disease). 
 The Act incorporates by reference the claim management 
and adjudication procedures of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act (the "Longshore Act") to govern the Department 
 
 
of Labor's administration of Part C of the Act (the employer-
funded federal workers' compensation program applicable to 
employees who have become totally disabled or died due to 
pneumoconiosis.)  See 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (incorporating most of 
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950); see also Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. 
v. Donovan, 713 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984). 
 In this case, our concern is with claims made to the 
Department of Labor for medical benefits only.  Therefore, there 
is no need to review the history of the involvement of the Social 
Security Administration and the manner of resolving claims made 
for miners' disability or death, all of which has been reviewed 
in prior cases.  See, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 
U.S. 105 (1988); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 
(1987); Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616, 
627-628 (3d Cir. 1994); Helen Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 924 
F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 As is set forth in these cases, the Act established the 
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, which is financed by a 
manufacturer's excise tax on coal.  That Fund pays benefits 
directly to claimants not only when there is no responsible 
operator, but also before a responsible operator is determined 
and in other circumstances established by law.  See e.g., Elliot 
Coal, 17 F.3d at 628; Helen Mining, 924 F.2d at 1272; 20 C.F.R. § 
725.522 (1993). 
 In certain circumstances, as those presented in these 
cases, when miners seek payment of medical expenses incurred for 
 
 
treatment of pneumoconiosis ("medical benefits only" or "MBO" 
claims), the Fund pays claimants before operator liability is 
determined, see 20 C.F.R. § 725.701A(b), and the Department will 
seek reimbursement from the responsible operator.  Sometime in 
1988, the Department adopted a new agency policy to collect 
interest on medical expenditures made by the Fund and later 
reimbursed by the operator or carrier.  Pursuant to this policy, 
the date on which the Fund paid the medical bill is the accrual 




 Proceedings in these cases 
 Although the facts of each of the six consolidated 
cases vary somewhat, those common to all make them appropriate 
for joint disposition here.  In each case, after determination 
that a valid MBO claim had been submitted, the district director2 
approved the claimant's request for medical treatment expenses; 
determined that one of the petitioners was the responsible 
operator; and, either some time before or after determination of 
the responsible operator, received a request from the claimant or 
his medical providers for payment for specific bills or treatment 
which, after the Department or its agent approved, was paid by 
the Trust Fund.3  Thereafter, the Department sought reimbursement 
from the operator.  In many of the cases the operator, as is its 
right, requested documentation for the medical expenses.  In all 
of the cases before us, the operator ultimately reimbursed the 
Fund for its payment (referred to by the Operators as 
reimbursement of the "principal" paid.) 
 Following the operator's acceptance of responsibility 
for the MBO, the Department of Labor, pursuant to Department 
                     
2.  By "district director" we refer to the initial screening 
officer of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs of the 
Department of Labor.  This individual may also be referred to as 
the "deputy commissioner" in the relevant statutes.  See, e.g., 
33 U.S.C. § 919(a) ("a claim for compensation may be filed with 
the deputy commissioner"). 
3.  The determination that the miner is eligible for medical 
benefits does not automatically entitle the claimant to payment 




policy, billed the operator for the interest due on the 
underlying claim.  As noted above, the interest was assessed from 
the date the Fund paid the claim.  In the cases before us, it 
appears that this interest period may have covered from five to 
nine years.  App. at 94-97; App. at 138, 140, 141.  In each case, 
the operator challenged this assessment of interest and the case 
was referred to Administrative Law Judge G. Marvin Bober, who 
consolidated the six cases for joint resolution.  The ALJ, 
believing that the issue was governed by the decision of the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Vahalik v. Youghiogheny 
& Ohio Coal Co., 970 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 1992), dismissed the 
cases for lack of jurisdiction in September 1992.   
 The Operators appealed the six cases to the Benefits 
Review Board, which held them in abeyance pending its resolution 
of Brown v. Sea "B" Mining Co., 17 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-115, 
1993 WL 172283 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1993) (en banc).  After it decided 
Sea "B", the Board dismissed these cases for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  The Operators appealed this decision to 
this court, filing petitions for review in the six cases on 
September 2 and 15, 1993. 
 II. 
 The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law over which this court exercises plenary review.  





 Right to a Hearing Before an ALJ 
 The Operators argue that the failure of the ALJ and the 
Board to exercise jurisdiction over this case has denied them the 
right to a hearing and review thereof as guaranteed in 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 919 and 921 (1988).  The Act provides that claims are filed 
with the deputy commissioner who has "full power and authority to 
hear and determine all questions in respect of such claim."  33 
U.S.C. § 919(a) (emphasis added).  Should any interested party so 
desire, the deputy commissioner must order a hearing before an 
administrative law judge.  See 33 U.S.C. § 919(c) and (d); Pyro 
Mining Co. v. Slaton, 879 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1989) 
("according to statute, [interested parties] have a right to a 
hearing before an administrative law judge on all questions in 
respect of a claim."). 
 The Act provides that following this determination 
there may be an appeal to the Board, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), and a 
petition for review thereafter to the court of appeals, id. § 
921(c).  See Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 
United States Dep't of Labor, 558 F.2d 685, 687-88 (3d Cir. 
1977).  The question before this court, then, is whether the 
Operators' challenge to the interest assessed against them is a 
"question[] in respect of [a] claim" such that it must be 
referred to an ALJ pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 919 or whether, as the 
Department argues, the challenge concerns a collateral attack on 
a final compensation order, jurisdiction over which rests in the 
district court pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 934(b)(4)(A). 
 
 
 The Operators recognize that after a black lung claim 
is determined on the merits by either an award or acceptance of 
liability by an operator, they are obliged to reimburse the Fund 
for the amount paid plus what the Operators term post-judgment 
interest, i.e., interest which runs from 30 days after the award 
or the acceptance of liability.  See 30 U.S.C. § 932(d).   
 The Operators contend that the charges assessed against 
them here constitute prejudgment interest, which is not 
authorized under the Act.  See, e.g., Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. 
Director, OWCP, 766 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1985); Youghiogheny & 
Ohio Coal Co. v. Warren, 841 F.2d 134, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1987).4  
They reason that because these challenges to interest assessed 
require interpretation and application of the Act and its 
enforcement scheme, they constitute "questions in respect of such 
claim."  
 The Department's position is that because the interest 
assessment involves a dispute solely between the Department and 
the operator, it does not constitute a question "in respect of 
such claim."  The Department's position is that the "claim" 
within the meaning of section 919, which triggers the right to 
review through the administrative process, is the claim on behalf 
of the disabled or deceased miner (the claimant). 
                     
4.  The Department disputes the characterization of the interest 
assessed as "prejudgment" for various reasons.  Because the 
nature of this interest is not before the court at this time, we 
need not consider the appropriate classification thereof and use 
the term for convenience. 
 
 
 This construction of "claim" has statutory support.  
The statute provides that a claim must be filed with "the deputy 
commissioner in the compensation district in which such injury or 
death occurred."  33 U.S.C. § 913(a).  Section 919(d), which 
governs "Procedure in respect of claims," provides that "a claim 
for compensation may be filed with the deputy commissioner . . . 
any time after the first seven days of disability following any 
injury, or at any time after death."  33 U.S.C. § 919(a).  
Because the "claim" to which these sections refer is that of the 
injured or deceased miner, the administrative procedure outlined 
in the subsections (c) and (d) of section 919 is available only 
to a party (usually the employer-operator or its carrier) who 
seeks to challenge some aspect of the miner's "claim," such as 
the miner's eligibility for some or all of the compensation 
sought or granted. 
 It is not disputed that determinations of underlying 
operator liability in MBO cases raise questions in respect of a 
claim.  Though framed as contests between the particular operator 
and the Fund over reimbursement, these determinations provide the 
means by which an operator may challenge the validity of all or 
part of the miner's initial claim, including each medical 
expense, even though it has already been paid by the Fund.  
Proceedings before the ALJ and the Board in these matters thus 
center on the evaluation of the claimant's entitlement to 
payments already disbursed by the Fund.  See, e.g., Stiltner v. 
Doris Coal Co., 14 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-116, 1990 WL 284122 
(Ben. Rev. Bd. 1990) (en banc) (affirming award of medical 
 
 
benefits and thus ordering operator and carrier to reimburse the 
Fund based on determination that miner's respiratory conditions 
were related to coal mine employment), rev'd in part, Doris Coal 
Co. v. Director, OWCP, 938 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1991); Skaggs v. 
Imperial Colliery Co., 14 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 3-311 (Admin. Law 
Judge 1990) (evaluating employer's challenge to certain medical 
bills already paid based on its contention that they were not 
related to miner's pneumoconiosis); Wright v. Beth-Elkhorn Coal 
Corp., 14 Black Lung Rep. 3-692 (MB) (Admin. Law Judge 1990) 
(employer not liable to reimburse Fund for medical expenses 
because miner was not eligible for them and Fund had paid them 
erroneously). 
 These underlying liability determinations stand in 
sharp contrast to the Operators' challenge to the Department's 
assessment of interest against them for the period before they 
accepted responsibility for the medical benefits.  The interest 
sought is not to benefit the claimant, nor is it sought on behalf 
of the claimant.  It is sought merely to reimburse the Fund for 
the time-value of money expended by the Fund when it paid for the 
miner's medical benefits.  This latter dispute is one exclusively 
between the Operators and the Fund.  As a result, although the 
demand for interest is predicated in the first instance on the 
fact that the miner filed the claim, it cannot be said to raise 
any "questions in respect of such claim," all of which have been 
resolved by then.   
 It follows that sections 919 and 921 do not provide the 
Operators the right to a hearing before an administrative law 
 
 
judge, nor to an appeal to the Benefits Review Board in these 
interest cases.  Instead, the Operators' opportunity to challenge 
this interest assessment is controlled by those statutory 
provisions concerning access to the district courts for 
enforcement of black lung liability. 
 B. 
 District Court Jurisdiction 
 District court jurisdiction arises under the Act under 
two statutory provisions: 33 U.S.C. § 921(d), one of the 
incorporated provisions of the Longshore Act, and 30 U.S.C. § 
934, a provision within the Black Lung Act itself.  In Connors v. 
Tremont Mining Co., 835 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1987), we set forth 
the requirements for district court jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 921(d) (Section 21 of the Longshore Act) as follows: "there 
must be . . . first, [a] final compensation order [that] has been 
effectuated, and second, . . . the responsible operator has 
failed to comply with that compensation order."  Id. at 1031. 
 District court access is also provided by 30 U.S.C. § 
934 (Section 424 of the Black Lung Act).  Subsection (b)(2) 
provides: 
 If any operator liable to the fund under paragraph 
[934(b)(1)] refuses to pay, after demand, the amount of 
such liability (including interest), then there shall 
be a lien in favor of the United States for such amount 
on all property and rights to property, whether real or 
personal, belonging to such operator. 
 




 In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect 
to pay the liability imposed under paragraph [934(b)] 
(2), the Secretary may bring a civil action in a 
district court of the United States to enforce the lien 
of the United States under this section with respect to 
such liability or to subject any property, of whatever 
nature, of the operator, or in which he has any right, 
title or interest, to the payment of such liability.  
 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 We have recognized the interaction between the two 
sections giving the district courts enforcement jurisdiction as 
follows: 
 [i]f an operator fails to pay an award of disability 
benefits for which he is liable, the successful 
claimant or the Secretary may bring an action in 
district court to enforce the order.  See 33 U.S.C. § 
921(d).  Moreover, the Secretary may bring an action to 
enforce a lien against an operator who fails to make 
payments to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.  30 
U.S.C. § 934(b)(4)(A). 
 
Compensation Dep't of Dist. Five, United Mine Workers of America 
v. Marshall, 667 F.2d 336, 339 n.6 (3d Cir. 1981).  Thus, 33 
U.S.C. § 921(d) enforces the operator's liability to pay benefits 
and 30 U.S.C. § 934(b) enforces the operator's liability to repay 
the Trust Fund. 
 There is no doubt that the Operators have failed to pay 
the amounts assessed in these six consolidated cases.  They 
argue, however, that an award is not final under either section 
921(d) or 934(b) unless the calculation of the amount due is 
finally decided, citing Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
Benefits Review Board, United States Dep't of Labor, 535 F.2d 
758, 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  In Sun Shipbuilding, we 
 
 
held that a decision is not final where the "extent of damage 
remains undetermined."  535 F.2d at 760.  Here, in each case the 
amount of underlying liability for the MBO has been clearly and 
finally determined and is not challenged by the operators.  Thus, 
Sun Shipbuilding is inapposite. 
 The Operators also argue that the district director's 
determinations of interest are not final because they were 
afforded no opportunity to contest them.  Whatever persuasiveness 
this claim may have in other contexts, in these cases the 
Operators have withdrawn their controversions to the specific 
medical expenses.  Thus, there was a final determination in each 
case.   
 We do not disagree that the Act gives the operators no 
right to challenge the interest determination in the 
administrative process.  Once the liability of the particular 
operator and the medical expenses for each claimant has been 
determined, the operator's liability for that amount plus 
interest becomes fixed as a matter of law.  See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 
§ 934(b)(1) (once the operator's liability is determined, "then 
the operator is liable to the United States for repayment to the 
fund of the amount of such benefits the payment of which is 
properly attributed to him plus interest thereon.").  Indeed, 
determination of the amount of interest due is a ministerial 
calculation because the rate is set by law.  See 30 U.S.C. §§ 
934(b)(5)(A) and (b)(5)(B) (incorporating by reference schedule 
provided in 26 U.S.C. § 6621).  It follows that the Department 
and the Board are correct that the Operators will have the 
 
 
opportunity to raise their challenge to the imposition of 
interest as a defense to a district court action brought by the 
Secretary for enforcement.5    
 Our determination that the district courts, and not the 
Office of the Administrative Law Judges and the Board, have 
jurisdiction over the claims presented here is supported by the 
recent opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161 (6th Cir. 
1992).  There, faced with a similar, albeit not precisely the 
same, situation which this court now considers, the Court of 
Appeals determined that neither the ALJ nor the Board had 
jurisdiction over the claim of the Department for interest in a 
medical benefits case, holding that the Department must file an 
action in the district court seeking enforcement of its lien and 
collection on the liability.  In Vahalik the operator had paid 
the initial interest assessment and then received a second 
assessment on the ground that the first had been based on a 
miscalculation.  The operator resisted payment, asserting the 
common law defenses of "account stated and settled" and equitable 
estoppel.  Although neither the ALJ nor the BRB questioned their 
own jurisdiction over the dispute, when the matter was on review 
before the Court of Appeals the Department challenged the 
jurisdiction assumed by the ALJ and the BRB over an operator's 
objection to interest assessed on reimbursement paid to the Fund.  
                     
5.  We take no position as to whether the Operators themselves 




The Vahalik court agreed, reasoning that "[o]nce final 
eligibility and liability determinations are made, the benefits 
of agency expertise become irrelevant, and jurisdiction is vested 
in the district courts for the enforcement of agency orders."  
Id. at 162.   
 This does not mean that the Operators will not have an 
opportunity to challenge the assessment of interest, either on 
the basis of a legal challenge or on the basis of a disagreement 
as to calculation.  In fact, in Reich v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal 
Co., No. C2-92-793, (S.D. Ohio May 13, 1994), the enforcement 
action brought by the Department under 30 U.S.C. § 934 to collect 
the interest at issue in the Vahalik case, the district court 
thoroughly addressed the challenges raised by the operator to the 
imposition of interest allegedly due to the Fund.  Without 
commenting on the correctness of the district court's decision 
regarding the validity of the interest claim (an issue not before 
us today), we note that the proceeding under that section 
provided the defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
its challenges to the interest assessed.   
 Thus we are satisfied that a district court enforcement 
proceeding would provide sufficient opportunity to the operators 
to raise their challenges to the interest assessments.  In fact, 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recently commented 
that the enforcement proceeding established by 30 U.S.C. § 921 




 it is . . . clear that the employer may contest factual 
allegations upon which the section 921(d) enforcement 
petition necessarily depends, including the main issue 
whether the employer is in default.  Moreover, arguably 
at least, the employer might be entitled to raise 
factual challenges relating to (1) the amount in 
default, (2) whether new evidence indicates that the 
initial compensation order was procedurally defective, 
or otherwise not "in accordance with law," or (3) 
employee conduct that might tilt the fundamental 
balance of equities in favor of judicial restraint. 
 
Williams v. Jones, 11 F.3d 247, 253 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis and 
footnotes omitted).  The court based this determination on its 
recognition that a section 921(d) proceeding represents the 
party's "first and only forum for a full hearing of such factual 
disputes prior to the issuance of an injunctive enforcement 
order, with its attendant exposure to coercive contempt 
proceedings."  Id. at 254.  Thus, we see no reason to conclude 
that the Operators will not be given a fair opportunity to 
challenge the validity of the interest assessments in an 
enforcement proceeding, whether under 33 U.S.C. § 921 or 30 
U.S.C. § 934. 
 Finally, the Operators argue that policy rationales 
weigh against a rule that would vest jurisdiction in this case 
and others like it in the district courts.  They argue that there 
are hundreds of cases which present similar facts, and that 
Congress could not have intended that these cases be tried in the 
district courts.  However, at oral argument, the Operators 
conceded that once the issue of the authority of the Department 
to assess what they term prejudgment interest is decided by a 
court of appeals, either on appeal from a district court or via 
 
 
petition from the Benefits Review Board, few, if any, cases 
concerning the imposition of interest will arise. 
 Thus, the Operators' policy argument is reduced to a 
preference for having the determination of the interest issue 
determined in an administrative proceeding, apparently because it 
is less expensive.  Even though, as noted above, it is not likely 
that there will be many grounds for challenging an interest award 
following determination of the threshold issue, we assume that 
there may be indeed a number of such instances.  Furthermore, we 
assume that there may be valid reasons to prefer the 
administrative process for determination of minor money claims  
over the adjudication of such cases by the district courts.  In 
the cases before us, the amount of interest assessed ranged from 
$70.03 to $25,671.  However, it is not our view as to the 
appropriate forum that is determinative.  Instead, we are dealing 
with Congress's scheme, and we are not free to make a decision 
based on our judgment in the matter.  If the operators have 
policy considerations that they believe are persuasive, their 
resort must be to Congress. 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition 
for review of BethEnergy and Barnes and Tucker because we agree 
with the Board that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
this dispute. 
 
 
 
 
 
